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ABSTRACT

Hurricane Katrina is widely regarded as the greatest natural disaster to ever befall
the United States. Following the storm’s devastation of the Gulf Coast region, a media
firestorm unleashed, seeking to ascribe responsibility to governmental actors for the
“failed” response effort. Through a comparative framing analysis, this study sought to
investigate how major news outlets, the White House, and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency framed the response efforts that followed Hurricane Katrina.
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Chapter One: Introduction
On Thursday, August 25, 2005 Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category
Five hurricane. Hurricane Katrina was labeled the greatest natural disaster to ever hit the
United States, leaving in its wake incalculable loss. Shortly after the storm passed, news
stories broke. In the months following, major newspapers broke hundreds of articles
recounting the utter devastate created by the storm, and the inadequacies of a federal
government to prepare and respond to Katrina.
In 1963, Bernard Cohen made an insightful observation when he stated, “[the press]
may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.” Although the issue is still
up for debate, some scholars believe that reporters and editors frame stories in a way that
focuses on or reflect their personal feelings (Kuypers, 2009). This study seeks to compare
the frames presented by the media, and compare those to the original reports provided by
the White House Press Secretary and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA).
To understand framing analysis, one must first understand what a frame is. Jim
Kuypers (2010), political communication scholar and framing researcher defined framing
as, “a process whereby communicators, consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a
point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted by others in a
particular manner.” In essence, a frame is the central or underlying theme under which
the facts or details are organized. The process of framing a particular event requires the
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construction of a particular viewpoint, emphasizing certain facts to produce a specific
interpretation of that event.
Framing analysis can be likened to the framing of a picture. When you frame a
picture, you have to select a frame that best suites the image. The frame may enhance
certain visual elements such as color, texture, or image within the photograph. If you
were to reframe the photograph, other elements or colors might become more apparent to
the viewer. Just as the frame changes the way a picture is viewed, the frame in which we
place events or ideas will have the same effect. Frames force us to filter our perceptions
in a very particular way, either enhancing or taking away from certain elements,
ultimately appealing to the framer’s view of the situation. As an acting definition,
framing is the process whereby communicators, consciously or subconsciously, construct
a particular point of view that encourages the facts of a particular situation to be viewed,
emphasizing certain facts while deemphasizing others.
Framing analysis is a derivative of agenda- setting theory first postulated by
McCombs and Reynolds in 1972. The central thesis of the theory hinges upon the
argument that the “[media has the] ability to influence the salience of topics on the public
agenda.” In short, the more salient an issue is, the more important the viewing audience
will regard the issue to be. Mass media outlets have demonstrated this concept through
the coverage of election campaigns, murder trials, and international conflict. While these
major events are inherently important, the focus and attention given to those issues only
serves to enhance the importance of the elements of the specific issues for the consumer.
Given the written account and detailed descriptions provided by governmental agencies
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and the media, employing a comparative framing analysis as the research method for this
study should provide particularly fruitful results.
Based on the theory of agenda setting, a study done in the early 1970s found that,
when asked, voters tend to share a commonality with what the media establishes as
important. As agenda setting theory establishes what we, as readers should think about,
agenda extension suggests how we should think about the issue at hand (Kuypers, 2009).
As a method of approaching agenda extension, reporters not only establish what is being
talked about, but also directly influence how we think about them in a value-laden sense
of the word. One method by which this influence is channeled is through framing. This is
accomplished through the process of pulling specific characteristics of an event and
assembling a narrative that promotes a specific interpretation.
When put in the context of news reporting, the demonstration of the process becomes
clear. Rarely do news reports contain every detail of an event. If reporting every detail
became the norm, the news would not be digestible. Instead, news reports collect the data
necessary to relay the general details of a particular event to the audience. The process by
which the author filters certain details out, includes others, or highlights specific details
more than others demonstrates the construction of a frame. At times, personal or
institutional biases influence the decision as to what to include, exclude, or highlight in a
given story.
This practice is equally true of governmental reporting. Although it cannot be
empirically proven, much of the data collected in this study would suggest that the biases
in governmental agencies are institutional, rather than individual. Governmental reporting
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tends to simply provide basic facts, the detail to which the facts are given and the degree
to which certain facts are highlighted demonstrate how government reports frame events.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
Studying the messages describing the response to Hurricane Katrina, and the
effects the messages had, has grown in prominence through the literature base. The role
that the media played in constructing public knowledge and understanding of the
recovery efforts has been a focal area of research, and within research, a pivotal point of
contention for many scholars.
In 2007, Fahmy, Kelly, and Kim performed a comparative visual analysis of news
wires and U.S. newspapers. Specifically, the authors looked to what images were selected
by newspapers compared to what was made available by newswires. The study found that
front-page photographs differed greatly between newspapers and newswires. The images
in newspapers tended to focus more on the victims, specifically non-white victims, rather
than photographs that encompassed the entirety of the storm. The authors ultimately
came to the conclusion that by employing visual frames that reflect specific controversial
issues, news outlets ultimately fail their responsibility of serving as the gatekeeper
(Lewin, 1943) to information dissemination. The results of their study suggest that the
role media outlets play in shaping public understanding and interpretation of events is
indisputable. The decision to select one photograph over another is indicative that media
bias is present within the selection process.
In 2005, Kuypers and Cooper performed a comparative framing analysis of the
2003 Iraq War. Looking at the stories from the New York Times and the Washington Post,
the researchers analyzed stories from behind-the-line reporters as compared to stories
published by embedded journalists. The results of the study found contradictory frames
5

on a given event, even within the same news source on multiple occasions. Although this
study does not specifically look at framing as it pertains to a natural disaster, it does
provide an excellent framework for comparing two competing frames.
Despite the popularity of research in the field of mass communication and a
growing trend within framing analysis, little work has been done in the field of
comparative framing analysis. From its beginnings as a formal research method in the
late 1980’s, framing analysis appears to be an up and coming trend in the field of
qualitative mass communication research (D'Angelo & Kuyper, 2010).
Cole & Kelli (2008) looked at risk communication through the case study of
Hurricane Katrina. As a principle of risk communication analysis, Cole and Kelli suggest
that a lack of cohesive networks poses a significant threat to the credibility of
governmental reporting. The study concluded that “message preparation before the crisis
is essential, and to be effective, messages must be credible to their recipient and
audience” (Cole & Kelli, 2008). We can draw several concepts from the findings of this
study. First, the lack of message preparation prior to Katrina’s landfall in New Orleans
can explain why the media’s framing of the event was preferred over governmental
reports. Additionally, the acknowledged failures of the emergency communication
equipment during the initial response may point to decreased credibility of government
reports.
In 2011, Johnson, Dolan, and Sonnett preformed a quantitative content analysis
looking at racial reporting in national television coverage after Hurricane Katrina. Given
the dense population of African Americans living within New Orleans during Katrina, the
authors sought to establish statistical support for claims that news broadcasts propagated
6

racial ideologies. The results of the study concluded an overwhelming presence of whites
filling speaking roles in news reports, despite the presence of a strong African Americans
population. The results suggest this was especially true in the hardest hit areas of New
Orleans. Additionally, the results of the study concluded that reports of African American
looters were especially critical without giving an opportunity for explanation for the
behavior. The results of the study suggest that the media is an incredibly powerful tool in
shaping public sentiment. Additionally, their ability to shape images along racial lines
must be acknowledged.
Building on the concept of public influence, Lundy and Broussard (2007) looked
at the role of public relations in shaping perception of a crisis event. Through a
qualitative approach, the authors interviewed fourteen public relations practitioners
through purposive sampling techniques. The results found, as a matter of practice, that
news organizations were the main conduit through which organizations communicated
with the public, including evacuees, citizens, and local constituents. Additionally, public
relations firms indicated that planning a response for Katrina was not particularly useful,
given the severity and magnitude of the storm. This research appears to contradict the
findings of Cole and Kelli, with regards to the construction of messages prior to the
crisis. Lundy and Broussard assert that the uniqueness of Katrina would render most
preliminary work useless.
In 2006, Durham performed a critical analysis of how the Bush administration
attempted to report the storm compared to those of mass media outlets. Durham argued
that the Bush administration sought to displace media reports by distributing news
releases through Public Broadcast System and National Public Radio. Through displacing
7

traditional news stories, specifically those critical of the Bush administration’s response,
Durham asserts the Bush administration sought to unhinge professional journalism as a
legitimate reporting mechanism. This critical approach to analyzing political influence on
news reporting suggests two issues. The first, that both agents have the ability to
influence and manipulate public understanding of an event. Secondly, that both agents
compete for the control or interpretation of a specific event.
Although both agents compete for dominant influence over public perception,
Miller and Goidel in 2009 contend that news organizations are uniquely poised to both
gather and transmit information, especially during a natural disaster. The case study of
Katrina, as analyzed by Miller and Goidel, pointed to both the importance of news
organizations in reporting on disasters as well as the limitations imposed on these reports
by institutional biases. The researchers contend that news organizations may distort
reality, perpetuate misinformation, and advance stereotypical analysis while under
institutional scrutiny. Ultimately, their research suggests that news organizations are
invaluable in reporting on events, and developments that transpire, but are limited in their
ability to gather rich information on the issues of causality and consequence. The
conclusions drawn by Miller and Goidel posit future consideration, especially given the
consequential nature of reporting surrounding the response effort. They also provide
insight in understanding the strengths and limitations imposed by institutional norms on
how news outlets construct understanding, and ultimately build frames for understanding
the nature of crisis events.
As previously stated, news outlets are ideally poised to report on and provide
details on the development of a particular event (Miller & Goidel, 2009). Sifting through
8

the information and establishing what is important is a key function of the press. Agenda
setting is the means by which news outlets sift through the details of events and make
certain characteristics more salient than others. Barnes et al. (2008) looked at media
agenda setting during Katrina by reviewing local, state, and national newspaper stories.
Specifically, the authors used Times Picayune, the Advocate, the Washington Post, and
the New York Times. Through a content analysis, Barnes et al. examined thematic
changes as disaster response evolved over the year following the storm. The results of the
study concluded that response systems were either not in place or were not prepared to
deal with a storm of such magnitude. The perception, whether real or not, that disaster
response systems were not in place to deal with such an event became a central theme in
reporting on Katrina, and functions as the focal characteristic of agenda setting employed
during the storm.
Although agenda setting focuses on establishing what we as readers should think
about, agenda extension expounds on the concept by suggesting not only what we should
think about, but also how to think about it. In 2006, Sommers et. al analyzed three aspects
of media depictions of hurricane Katrina. Looking at the relationship between race and
crisis reporting, the authors perform a critical analysis of the language used to report on
particular issues. The results of the study found that even word choice affected the
meaning of the message conveyed. Using terminology such as “refugee,” “evacuees,”
“survivors,” or “victims” all carried different connotations. In each instance the word
selected carries with it a unique interpretation of a story (Sommers, Apfelbaum, Dukes,
Toosi, & Wang, 2006).
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Of a similar vein of interest, Voorhees, Vick, and Perkins (2007) studied the
portrayal of minority groups in the media in the wake of Katrina. Through content
analysis, the researchers analyzed the nature of minority representation in news
broadcasts. The results found that the majority of reporting framed ethnic minorities
almost exclusively as the victim. This construction of minorities as victims served to
illustrate the role that media takes in shaping the understanding of an event; regardless of
how accurate that understanding is compared to reality. In many ways the effect these
interpretations have on public perception of an event serve as contributing variables that
go into frame construction.
While racial roles influence the way the media constructs frames, they are not the
only point of contention between news story construction and reality. In 2007, Littlefield
and Quenette looked at the portrayal of authority by media outlets during Katrina. Using
a Burkean analysis, the researchers sought to understand how the media characterized the
response effort to Katrina by legitimate authorities. Drawing from news articles out of
national and local papers, the results found a clustering of results around the military,
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the President, and federal/state governments.
Littlefield and Quenette found the news media stepped outside the role of an objective
observer and pointed blame towards those within positions of authority. From this
perspective, the media created an evaluative view of reality. The construction of these
perspectives, according to the authors, had the ability to influence how authorities frame
their crisis responses.
Just as agenda extension tells us how to think about a particular event, framing
analysis looks as how the collection of individual interpretations and agendas come
10

together to create an overarching theme which subsumes the events. Cho and Gower
(2006) studied the effects of human interest as a frame on crisis news coverage. Through
a factorial analysis, the researchers looked at how human interest frames and non-human
interest frames compete, under the conditions of accidental and transgressional crises.
While the results found that there was little difference in blame between accidental and
transgressional crises, attribution of responsibility was more pronounced when a humaninterest frame was present. From this analysis, we can assert that crisis response measures
that fail to address human interests as a primary concern are more likely to be viewed in a
critical light.
Although human interest is a focal crisis news frame, An and Gower (2009) found
additional frames present within crisis reporting. Through a content analysis of crisis
news in 2006, the authors found responsibility, conflict, morality, economic implications,
and levels of responsibility to be prevalent frames. The results of the study found that
news media outlets tend to assign specific blame to an individual or organization for a
given crisis. This research, apart from expanding the horizons of framing analysis, points
to the focal question of accountability for Hurricane Katrina. As noted by Cho and Gower
(2006), even when a crisis is accidental, as was Hurricane Katrina, the assignment of
responsibility is still present in the extension of media agendas.
In 2009, Dill and Wu looked directly at framing in regional and national
newspapers. Through a content analysis, the authors established a distinct difference
between the frames of local and frames of national newspapers. Dill and Wu chose to
look at front-page articles from the Washington Post, New York Times, the New Orleans
Times-Picayune, and Biloxi Sun Herald for two weeks following the storm. The results of
11

the study confirmed local newspapers tended to make the destruction and devastation the
central theme of their reporting, whereas national outlets appeared to cover devastation to
a lesser extent, trumped by governmental and response criticisms. This research certainly
sets up the groundwork for a framing analysis, looking at how major news outlets framed
the events around Katrina, but does not specifically examine how frames compete as
interpretations of events.
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Chapter Three: Methods
A comparative framing analysis was conducted in this study. The study examined
how both news media outlets and government agencies framed the events of and response
efforts to Hurricane Katrina. Specifically, the study compared the frames present within
sixty-five press briefings by the Office of the Press Secretary, 185 press releases from the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and contrasted them to the frames
presented in 312 printed newspaper articles. For the sake of thoroughness, the study
focused on stories covered by The Washington Post, The New York Times, and USA
Today. Appendix A has a cited list of all sources looked at in this study.
Articles were selected from the three major newspapers using the Lexis Nexis
search engine. Boolean expressions were used for article identification including
“hurricane” and “Katrina” in headlines and leads. Press releases and briefings were
collected from the FEMA Press Release Archives and Office of the Press Secretary
Archives, respectively. Articles and releases that made minimal references to the storm
(eg. obituaries, letters to the editor, and news briefs) were excluded from the study.
There are several reasons why this research measure specifically focused on
printed stories. First, printed media makes for greater transparency in the research
method. With both electronic and hard copy versions available, anyone is able to access
the data used to assess the warrants of the analysis of this study. Second, this minimized
the interpretation of vocalic and nonverbal cues present within electronic media.
Additionally, these papers are widely circulated and are considered papers of record. As
they are widely circulated, the frames present within are more likely to be influential to a
13

greater number of readers. To understand the frames employed and to perform a
comparison, the following research questions were posed:
RQ 1: How did the White House frame the recovery efforts to Hurricane Katrina?
RQ 2: How did FEMA frame the recovery efforts to Hurricane Katrina?
RQ 3 How did the press frame the recovery efforts to Hurricane Katrina?
RQ 4: Did the frames presented by FEMA, the White House, and the press
coincide?
RQ 5: Did the frames presented by FEMA, the White House, and the press
contradict?
To identify the frames the researcher read each article, briefing, and press release
and established a thesis or organizing theme. After establishing the frame, each was
compiled in a list, according to organization. Once all of the data was examined, the
process was repeated to confirm the validity of the frames. From there, frames were
documented and reported. Finally, frames were compared and contrasted to determine
where correlations or contradictions existed.
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Chapter Four: Results
White House Framing
President George W. Bush issued a number of statements and spoke at a number
of public occasions regarding Hurricane Katrina, this study specifically looked at White
House Press Briefings from Press Secretaries Scott McClellan and Tony Snow. The
reasons for this are twofold: First, Presidential press briefings operated much like a
question and answer period, allowing for pointed questions to be raised and responded to.
Second, each of the newspapers addressed in this study had a representative at the White
House briefings. As such, stories published after a briefing may have been influenced by
the contents of the briefing.
As an agency, the White House had a vested interest in framing the response
efforts in a positive light. Despite numerous attempts by questioners to address outlying
issues such as rumors, criticisms, and finger-pointing, the White House remained
steadfast on reporting the successes and continued efforts to address the needs of those
devastated by Hurricane Katrina. Through this study, two major frames were identified.
Keeping Focused
A prominent theme present throughout all reports produced by the White House
was the importance placed on keeping the focus on response efforts. From the onset of
the recovery, the White House self-described President Bush and his cabinet as “focused”
on helping those affected by the storm rebuild and recover. For the first several weeks
following the storm, excerpts such as the following were present in most briefings:
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… the President chaired a Cabinet meeting. As you heard from the
President, this was very much an action-focused meeting. The President called
this meeting to make sure that we are on top of the immediate needs and that we
are moving forward on plans to address the long-term response. The President
wanted to make sure that we are identifying and working to solve problems -- and
if things are not working as they should, that we are fixing them and making them
work. People continue to work round-the-clock (Office of the Press Secretary,
2005, p. 1).
Prefacing each briefing with statements such as these constructed the idea that the
Bush Administration and his cabinet were focusing a great deal of their efforts helping
those in need. As floodwaters began to recede, news stories seeking to ascribe
responsibility for “delayed” or “inadequate” response efforts became more prominent. As
these stories grew in prominence, the issue of federal accountability became more and
more prevalent in White House briefings.
Q: Thank you. Recently Fran Townsend, when she came up from that podium,
and Michael Chertoff, when he testified before Congress, were highly critical of
former FEMA Director Michael Brown, and specifically both said he went
outside the established rules for a FEMA director during Katrina. Appearing on
television last Sunday, Mr. Brown says that is absolutely not true, that both of
them should know better; he followed the same procedure that every FEMA
director does in an emergency. Does the White House have an opinion on this?
MR. McClellan: Well, I think that our view is that we need to continue focusing
our efforts where they should be, which is on helping the people of the Gulf Coast
recover and rebuild their communities. That's what the President is doing. That's
why he visited the region just last week, and that's where we're going to keep our
focus. We're going to continue working to make sure the federal government is
doing everything we can to support the people along the Gulf Coast as they
rebuild their lives and rebuild their communities (Office of the Press Secretary,
2006, p. 9).
Despite efforts to draw attention to question of accountability, the White House
remained dedicated to “staying focused” on helping victims. Excerpts similar to the last
were present within briefings throughout September, October, and November 2005. The
16

reiteration of the term “focus” brings into light what the overarching frame was that the
White House projected:
… right now we remain focused on the most immediate priorities, and that is
continuing to help those who are in need and continuing to make sure they're
getting the assistance they need and continuing to solve the ongoing problems.
There are people working round-the-clock. There is a lot of progress that has been
made, but there are ongoing challenges and ongoing problems. The President is
not satisfied, and we've got to remain focused on the task at hand. But he made it
clear that he wants to know what happened and how the response went and what
the facts are. And we will do that at the appropriate time (Office of the Press
Secretary, 2005, p. 3).
The central idea which subsumes the other details is that the federal government is doing
everything within its power to address the needs of the victims, and we are seeing results.
Lessons Learned
Toward the end of the year and the onset of the 2006 hurricane season, questions
began to arise regarding federal preparation for the “next storm.” As part of addressing
those concerns, the White House acknowledged some shortcomings to the Katrina
response efforts:
Our communications system was broken. It was broken between the local
community and the state. It was broken between the state and the federal
government, and quite frankly, broken inside the federal government itself. We
did not have a good system in place to share information. We didn't have a good
system in place to share communication with each other, to understand what each
different department was doing from one side of FEMA to the other, from inside
of DHS; we didn't have a system in place (Office of the Press Secretary, 2006, p.
4).
This message resonated through the last few months of the study.
Acknowledgment of responsibility for failed communication systems was a prevalent
concern in most press briefings, but never actually appeared as a matter of criticism
17

within news reports. At the same token, most of the reports which followed from this
acknowledged the communication disconnect, but expounded on the issue further. As the
Director of FEMA stated in a press briefing:
First thing I did was to step back and look at what didn't work in Katrina, what
things went wrong, what things worked okay but we could have done a lot better.
And there were several significant things that I saw, based on my experience of
handling disasters, what I saw simply didn't work.
The first and foremost was communications. There was a major breakdown in
communications between the local government and the state government, a
breakdown between the state government and the federal government, and then,
quite frankly, a breakdown of communication inside the federal government itself
between agencies. If you're going to run an operation, that type of communication
system simply will not work.
So we went back and looked at how we're going to put this together. We based it
primarily on the National Response Plan -- we're going to focus on having a
unified command system. And that will go through our joint field office that you
guys are familiar with. And everybody has bought into it. We've had exercises at
the Assistant Secretary level, the Deputy Secretary, and even with the Secretaries
in the White House. And everyone understands that have to be on the same page.
As we do our 12R planning blocks, we all have to be there together doing it,
sharing information and making sure that we're all -- have the same information
and are responding in the same way (Office of the Press Secretary, 2006, p. 1).
Ideas similar to these were prevalent throughout White House reports toward the
end of this study. From these briefings we can extrapolate two major frames. The first,
that the Bush administration framed the response efforts in terms of dedication towards
the response effort. Beyond the focus put on the response efforts, the frame suggests the
administration sought to demonstrate a dedicated and thorough approach to rebuilding
after Katrina. Secondly, the shortcomings in the response efforts were lessons to be
learned. Despite the effects that the breakdown in communications had on the response
efforts, the White House constructed the issue in a way that demonstrated a responsive
18

government, building better response plans for the future.

FEMA Framing
In many respects, the White House and Federal Emergency Management Agency
sought to frame the response effort in a similar manner. Given shared accountability for
the successes and failures of the response efforts in the press, this should come as no
surprise. The approach taken to frame the response as a success differed greatly between
both organizations. Although the White House framed the response in terms of focused
and long-term approach, FEMA constructed a similar frame of success through specific
details of the approach.

A Holistic Approach
FEMA reports covered details of Disaster Medical Response teams deploying
from all over the country, the number of shelters established, as well as assurance that
thousands of trucks carrying food, water, and ice were either en route to or had arrived at
targeted areas with these supplies. (FEMA, 2005) Beyond notification of federal fund
allocation to the response, FEMA provided a series of notification of additional resources
allocated to response efforts. These include:



Legal aid with disaster related legal questions



Subsidized debris removal from public property



Extended unemployment benefits (initially 26 weeks, but later extended)
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Pet rescue



Temporary housing



Hotel subsidization for displaced victims



Minor emergency home repairs



Crisis Counseling



Translation assistance for federal aid applicants (available in any language)



Peace Corps volunteer allocation



Community Relations Teams to assist victims with the application process



SBA Loans



Disaster Recovery Centers

Providing the specific details of what measures were taken to help the victims of Katrina,
paired with the extensive list of types of aid available, shapes the central theme of the
FEMA response, FEMA is responding with everything in the arsenal.

By the Numbers
Throughout the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA instituted the
practice of publishing weekly details of the emergency, transitional, and reconstructive
activities being carried out in the gulf. Published at least once weekly, these reports listed
specific details including, but not limited to, the number of applications for aid received,
the number of MRE’s (meals-ready-to-eat) distributed, gallons of water handed out, and
the current dollar figure of federal funds allocated to the response effort. At the onset of
the storm, press releases such as the following were issued:
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“The priority at this time is to meet the immediate life saving and life sustaining
needs of victims in the impacted areas,” said Brown. “FEMA, along with other
federal partners and state governments, is coordinating a massive mobilization of
resources for urban search and rescue efforts, housing, food and medical care.”
Federal response activities include:
•

•

•

•

•
•
•

As of early August 31, more than 54,000 people were in 317 shelters.
FEMA is working with a multi-state housing task force to address
expected continued sheltering and eventual housing needs. More than
82,000 meals have been served in the impacted areas.
More than 1,700 trucks have been mobilized through federal, state and
contract sources to supply ice, water and supplies. These supplies and
equipment are being moved into the hardest hit areas as quickly as
possible, especially water, ice, meals, medical supplies, and generators. It
may, however, take several days for supplies and equipment to reach all
victims because of damaged and closed roads and bridges.
Eighteen of FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue task forces and two
Incident Support Teams are working in Louisiana and Mississippi Eight
swift water teams from California are also deployed making a total of
1,200 people conducting search and rescue missions. All 28 of FEMA’s
teams are activated for response, with the balance staged, enroute or
mobilized.
Fifty-one teams from the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) have
been deployed, including five Disaster Medical Assistance Teams
(DMATs) that are supporting New Orleans medical facilities and hospitals
not fully operational. These teams have truckloads of medical equipment
and supplies with them and are trained to handle trauma, pediatrics,
surgery and mental health problems. Additional teams are staged in
Anniston, Ala.; Camp Shelby, Miss.; and Baton Rouge, La., and will move
out as conditions permit.
NDMS has identified 2,600 hospital beds in a 12-state area around the
affected area and is working with the U.S. Departments of Defense and
Veterans Affairs to move patients to these facilities.
USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service is providing food at shelters and mass
feeding sites and issuing emergency food stamps, infant formula and food
packages to households in need.
FEMA is coordinating logistics with the U.S. Department of
Transportation and Louisiana National Guard in support of the ground
evacuation of refugees sheltered at the Superdome in New Orleans to the
Houston Astrodome in Harris County, Texas.

A team of 66 transportation experts is supporting state and local officials in the
damage assessment of highways, railroads, airports, transit systems, ports and
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pipelines. The Department of Transportation is supporting detour planning and
critical transportation system repairs (FEMA, 2005).
Details outlined in reports such as this pointed directly at the mobilization of
resources and the rapid response to finding shelters for victims and providing them with
essential emergency supplies, starting the day the storm hit Louisiana. The title of the
article, “Life Safety Tops FEMA Priorities, Supplies Pour In” suggests both the level of
importance that FEMA placed on responding to the crisis, as well as the allocation of
resources to meet the needs of victims.
As time passed and the waters receded, FEMA continued to issue weekly
statements, listing in terms of dollars and people, the recovery efforts. Weekly statements
similar to the following were produced for Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana:

$6.7 billion

$2.2 billion

$1.5 billion

$1.1 billion

To date, FEMA has approved nearly $6.7 billion in federal funding to aid
Mississippians through various Individual Assistance and Public Assistance programs,
as well as mission assignments, which FEMA tasked to other federal agencies.
FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has paid more than $2.2 billion in
flood insurance claims to policyholders in Mississippi. The NFIP plays a critical role in
encouraging communities to adopt, implement and enforce broader floodplainmanagement regulations and programs.
The U.S. Small Business Administration Disaster Assistance Program has approved
more than $1.5 billion in low-interest loans for homeowners, renters and business
owners throughout Mississippi.
More than $1.1 billion in assistance has been disbursed to nearly 270,000 Mississippi
households that have registered through FEMA's Individuals and Households Program
(IHP). The IHP consists of Housing Assistance, which may be used to pay for rent,
repair or housing construction and Other Needs Assistance (ONA) which may be
provided for uninsured or under-insured disaster-related necessary expenses. ONA is a
cost-share program which is 75 percent federally funded, 25 percent state funded.
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$747
million

34 million

515,600

99,000

900

13

11

2

The Public Assistance program has obligated nearly $747 million for emergency work
and infrastructure repair. This includes $423 million for debris removal, $42.5 million
to repair public facilities, $212 million for emergency protective measures, $4 million
to repair roads and bridges and $50 million to restore public utilities.
Almost 34 million cubic yards of [sic] debris has [sic] been removed from public and
private property so far. FEMA continues to reimburse Mississippi 100 percent for this
expense and will do so until March 15, 2006.
More than 515,600 Mississippians have registered for assistance through the FEMA
toll-free number at 1-800-621-FEMA (3362) or (TTY) 1-800-462-7585 for speech- or
hearing-impaired applicants or online at www.FEMA.gov .
More than 99,000 people are temporarily housed in nearly 37,000 FEMA-provided
travel trailers and mobile homes. This includes almost 2,000 units that are mobile
homes fully compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or are ADAfriendly travel trailers.
More than 900 Community Relations (CR) field personnel have operated throughout
Mississippi since the beginning of disaster response and recovery efforts. CR field
teams visit communities and distribute resource materials, providing personalized
assistance and helpful information to individuals, community-based organizations and
local officials affected by the disaster. There are currently 40 CR field personnel
working in Mississippi.
Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) operate throughout Mississippi to assist people
affected by Hurricane Katrina. More than 426,000 Mississippians have visited DRCs
since the first one opened Sept. 6, 2005, just days after Hurricane Katrina made
landfall.
March 11, 2006, is the deadline for new applications to FEMA's Individuals and
Households Program. Federal and state officials encourage households affected by
Hurricane Katrina to seek aid. Assistance to current applicants will continue to be
provided after this date, but no new applications will be accepted.
Two easy ways to register for disaster assistance. Call the toll-free FEMA Helpline
number at 1-800-621-FEMA (3362) or (TTY) 1-800-462-7585 OR register online at
www.FEMA.gov . People can also call the FEMA Helpline, at the same number, to
provide additional information or to inquire about the status of an existing registration.
(FEMA, 2006)
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As can be seen in the previous chart, as the recovery efforts shifted from
immediate emergency response to rebuilding and repairing, the details of the weekly
reports shifted to demonstrate long term resources still available, the number of federal
dollars allocated, and the number of families helped. Though the frame constructed by
these reports remains consistent, the details used to construct the idea that FEMA is
responding and people are receiving help changed over time. By the one-year anniversary
of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA issued a series of press releases that contained information
similar to the following:
Louisiana Statistics through August 17, 2006
3 Hurricane Katrina was the third strongest hurricane to make landfall in the United
States. Hurricane Wilma was the strongest and the Labor Day Hurricane of 1935 was
second strongest.
12 At the peak of the disaster, 12 mobile DRCs were operating.
32 Currently, 32 families are living in hotels/motels.
59 At the beginning of the disaster, there were 59 fixed DRCs.
150 Currently, 150 housing inspectors are in the field to assess damage to homes.
12,400 U.S. Small Business Administration has approved more than 12,400 disaster assistance
loans to businesses and non-profit organizations.
72,360 SBA has approved 72,360 loans to renters and homeowners.
418,000 More than 418,000 Louisianians currently hold National Flood Insurance policies.
950,000 DRC staff has provided, in-person, assistance to more than 950,000 households.
1 million More than 1 million inspections have been completed to date.
$1.3 billion SBA has approved a total of $1.3 billion in loans to business owners.
1.4 million More than 1.4 million applicants have registered for housing and other needs
assistance.
45.6 million The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, along with private contractors working for some
Louisiana parishes, have removed more than 45.6 million cubic yards of debris under
a FEMA-funded mission assignment.
$725 FEMA approved $725 million in Community Disaster Loans to help keep essential
million services operating in communities hardest hit by Hurricane Katrina.
$4.7 billion More than $4.7 billion in SBA loans has been approved for renters and homeowners.
$5.1 billion More than $5.1 billion have been provided to applicants in housing assistance and
other needs assistance.
$13.2 More than $13.2 billion has been paid under NFIP to policyholders in Louisiana.
billion (FEMA, 2005)
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Reports like this demonstrate the message that FEMA attempted to convey
through framing their response efforts by the numbers: FEMA is taking an active role in
responding to and meeting the needs of the victims of Hurricane Katrina.

News Outlet Framing
As a general consensus, the frames presented by White House and FEMA
reports suggest a strong, federal response to the disaster in the gulf. In many regards, the
frames presented by the New York Times, the Washington Post, and USA Today conveyed
very different ideas about the federal response. Although headlines themselves do not
construct frames, they do provide valuable insight into the stories they precede. Based on
Sperber and Wilson’s theory of relevance (1986), headlines present contextual clues to
message content with minimal processing effort.
Headlines such as FEMA Fails Katrina Victims, A Compassionate Bush Was
Absent Right After Katrina, A Swifter Response to Katrina Was Possible, ‘A Nightmare’
of Missing Kids After Katrina, Brown Defends FEMA’s Efforts; Former Agency Director
Spreads Blame for Failures in Katrina Response all suggest very different stories, but an
overarching theme presents itself: the response to Katrina, to one extent or another, was
not sufficient. Within news reports covering the Hurricane Katrina response efforts, three
prominent themes were found: an insufficient or delayed federal response, a racially
charged federal response, and a failed federal response.

Insufficiencies
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In many regards, the understanding that federal response efforts to meeting the
needs of the victims of Hurricane Katrina were not up to acceptable standards, was a
prevalent theme in Katrina reporting. As stories in the press broke of stranded
communities stuck between flooded wastelands weeks after the response efforts began,
both congresspersons and members of the press investigated what had happened and why
so many were still without the most basic necessities. In a September 7, 2005 Washington
Post article, Senator Susan Collins was cited as questioning the weak response, especially
in light to the extensive funding allocated to emergency preparedness following
September 11, 2001.
“If our system did such a poor job when there was no enemy, how would the
federal, state and local governments have coped with a terrorist attack that
provided no advance warning and that was intent on causing as much death and
destruction as possible?" the chairman of the Senate Homeland Security
Committee wondered, announcing a probe into the response to Hurricane Katrina.
"How is it possible that almost four years to the day after the attacks on our
country, with billions of dollars spent to improve our preparedness, that a major
area of our nation was so ill prepared to respond to a catastrophe (Milbank,
2005)?”
Apart from questions raised about the issue of preparation, emergency responses
even came under sharp criticism in stories such as the New York Times article titled,
“Stumbling storm- aid effort put tons of ice on trips to nowhere.” Detailed accounts of
emergency responders rushing to the scene, only being told to turn around or to move to
one destination after another, filled headlines across the country. Meanwhile, the
mobilization of response efforts was even called into question.
Three days after landfall, only a handful of National Guard troops had arrived.
Those forces were specialized units such as military police companies (to try to
restore order), small search-and-rescue units (to seek out individuals trapped in
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attics), small reconnaissance units (to map the devastation) and small medical
units (Southern Maryland Extra, 2005).
Even as the response effort shifted from immediate emergency response to
rebuilding, criticisms drawn from federal investigation on the response effort were
present. “Criticism of the government’s sluggish response to Hurricane Katrina was
largely deserved, the Homeland Security Departments internal watchdog concludes in a
report rapping the agency for focusing on terrorism at the expense of preparing for
natural disasters” (Leavitt, 2006) . Stories similar to these paint a clear picture that the
federal response was neither timely nor effective.

Racial Undertones
While stories were occasionally run throughout the year following the storm, for
approximately a two week period near the onset of the emergency response efforts,
stories of racial indignation on behalf of the Bush Administration were found in all three
papers. The theme first broke in a September 4, 2005 story wherein Lani Guinier, a
Harvard University law professor expressed the following sentiment regarding the
administration’s response to Hurricane Katrina:
Poor black people are "the canary in the mine. Poor black people are the
throwaway people. And we pathologize them in order to justify our disregard. But
this is not just about poor black people in New Orleans. This is about a social
movement, with an administration that is bent on weakening the capacity of the
national government to act. . . . I hope this is a wake-up call to all of America. To
see this as the tip of the iceberg, the thin edge of the wedge. We ignored the early
warning signals. But this is another early warning that we are ill prepared to
function as a society (Duke & Wiltz, 2005).
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The incorporation of this kind of analysis in news reporting certainly
demonstrates how the media has moved beyond its role of agenda setting and into agenda
extension. In the wake of the greatest natural disaster to hit the United States, stories
continued to appear developing this frame further. On September 12, 2005, the
Washington Post broke a story, citing the current President.
“I mean, it's puzzling, given his immediate response during 9/11, that he did not
feel a greater sense of empathy towards the folks that were experiencing this
enormous disaster," Sen. Barack Obama (D-Ill.) said yesterday on ABC's "This
Week” (Fletcher, 2005).
While stories similar to these were consistently prevalent for roughly two weeks
of this fifty-two week study, the argument still underscores the major interpretation of the
federal response efforts, one of inadequacy. ."

A Failed Response
Either as the central frame applied to the federal response effort or a
subcomponent of another theme, some printed news outlets framed the response efforts
as a failure. Typically, stories that framed the response as a failure include grim details of
what appear to be something out of a horror story. Regardless, some stories cast the
previously framed delayed response as the equivalent of not responding at all.
When it became clear that tens of thousands were marooned, the federal
government was unprepared to rush life-saving supplies to the city's Superdome
and convention center, to rescue the stranded and sick or keep order in the streets
(FEMA fails katrina victims, 2005).
The adversarial agenda present within articles similar to this asserted the simple
fact that the government was not poised to respond any better than they did should be
taken into consideration when assessing the overall success of failure of the effort. This
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approach, without otherwise coming out and stating it, framed the response as either an
all or nothing success.
Katrina exposed FEMA as a dysfunctional organization, paralyzed in a crisis four
years after the supposedly galvanizing attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. And it turned
Brown -- a former executive of the International Arabian Horse Association who
had no emergency management experience before joining the Bush administration
-- into a symbol of government ineptitude (Grunwald & Glasser, 2005).

Labeling the organization responsible for emergency response efforts and the
director of the organization as inept, certainly frame the agency, and any forthcoming
content, as inadequate. The construction of the response efforts as a failure in
governmental responsibility lends itself to the overarching theme present within almost
all of the stories published by printed news stories. At the very least, news outlets
constructed a frame which demonstrated a government either incapable or unwilling to
respond to the needs of its citizens in crisis.

Coinciding Frames
Having now looked at how FEMA, the White House, and printed news outlets
framed the response efforts, we can look to where frames coincided. In many respects,
themes presented by both FEMA and the White House overlapped at various points.
Although these overlaps do not demonstrate overlaps in framing, they do point to
elements of the two frames that coincide. Both organizations framed the response efforts
in terms of a strong, centralized approached. While the White House reports focused on
the overarching message of governmental mobilization, FEMA provided more specific
details outlining how the government had mobilized response and recovery efforts. While
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the White House approached the frame from a more diplomatic, public affairs
perspective, FEMA constructed the frame around detail orientation and construction.

Contradicting Frames
Given the similarities between FEMA and White House reporting, it’s no surprise
that their frames differed from the news outlets. The White House framed the response
effort as a strong, centralized approach. The frames constructed around the racial tensions
and adequacy of response efforts posed by media outlets clearly contradicts the White
House’s interpretation of the events. A reason for this contradiction may be that both
frames speak to different issues. First, the White House constructed a frame to suggest
that the response effort was exhaustive, and a primary focus of the Bush Administration.
This interpretation does not suggest a definitive ruling as a failure or a success, but rather
an interpretation which suggests that solving problems and helping victims was the name
of the game. The media’s framing of the response as either a success or a failure requires
a value-laden assessment of the response efforts. At the point that the White House never
attempted to frame the response in a value-laden approach, these interpretations seem to
counteract each other without actually directly clashing.
Another contradiction came from competing interpretations as to the level of the
response efforts. A major frame presented by news outlets was that of lacking federal
response. The general interpretation of articles which constructed this frame suggests that
FEMA was ill prepared to handle such a crisis, and in turn dropped the ball on getting aid
to those in need. In stark contrast to this message, FEMA’s approach to constructing
frames with the “by the numbers” approach would suggest that resources were in fact
30

mobilized, and reports citing specific details of the number of families served and the
amount of aid given would contradict the frame presented by news outlets.
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Chapter Five: Discussion
Reporting on Hurricane Katrina differed greatly between government and news
sources. Government reports often described the response effort as successful. These
stories described a victim-centered approach to the response, the deployment of all
available resources, and an ongoing effort to ensure the rebuilding of the Gulf region.
Stories published by news outlets described the event in terms of the
shortcomings and failures they deemed apparent at the time. News outlets focused on a
disorganized response effort; a non-existent response effort; a racially charged response:
and the inadequacy of the Bush Administration paired with an inept leadership over
FEMA.
Looking to the first research question regarding how the White House framed the
hurricane response, the overarching frame is that of a highly focused, results oriented
White House. Through the articulation of successful response measures and continued
focus to return the gulf to its original state, the White House constructed a frame of a
strong governmental response.
The second research questions asked how FEMA framed the recovery efforts.
Through a more detail-oriented approach, FEMA constructed a frame of an exhaustive
and long-term recovery response.
To the third research question, how printed news outlets framed the response,
outlets varied in how they framed the recovery efforts. While the overarching theme
suggests that the response efforts were inadequate, the frames constructed include a failed
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response effort, a racially motivated response effort, or a delayed/dysfunctional response
effort.
As to the fourth research question, regarding coinciding frames, although there
were points of overlap in the way in which FEMA and the White House framed the
recovery efforts, the two frames varied slightly, both in their construction and overall
interpretation.
To the last research question, regarding the contradiction of frames, there were
several points of contention. First, the White House and news outlets framed the federal
approach in different ways. Although the White House presented the frame as a strong,
focused federal approach, news outlets framed the response in terms of a failed
fragmented debacle of the Bush Administration.
Second, FEMA framed the response efforts in terms of a detailed construction of
response methods employed, whereas news outlets framed the response in terms of a
lacking federal response. These two frames provide a glaring contradiction, which may
be explained in the value-laden approach to assess the response efforts employed by news
outlets.
To some extent, the differences in framing can be attributed to the sources each
used to acquire their information. In many regards, the lack of source knowledge prevents
the reader from adequately assessing the response in a non-biased manner. Although we
know that the White House received their news from FEMA, and FEMA received their
news from operations on the ground, the news reporting sources are largely unknown. It
is highly unlikely that news reports were drawn from thin air, but the influences upon the
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development of the stories would provide valuable insight into the discrepancy between
governmental and non-governmental news sources.
Ultimately, these results would suggest a biased approach from both types of
sources. The governmental reports never seem to clash head on with the reports published
in major news outlets, as they appear to construct the event as a tragedy that received the
best possible response, given the limitations imposed. This type of reporting goes along
with the required “record it” theme present in most governmental publication. These
reports tend to provide detailed lists of what was being done, and little analysis of the
issues being discussed. It seems reasonable to assert that the limited analysis provided in
White House and FEMA reports would suggest either an acknowledgement of failure, or
a disregard towards responding to contradictory stories presented by the press.
Alternatively, news outlets published stories following the release of White House
and FEMA reports that appear to contradict these stories. Just as governmental reports
failed to address the claims of news reporters covering the response, news outlets failed
to address government reports head on. It was the exclusive construction of
organizational frames that opened both governmental and news reports to significant
criticism.

Limitations
One limitation to this type of research is researcher bias. Although researcher bias
cannot be entirely eliminated from the textual analysis, the sheer number of stories
looked, as paired with researcher efforts to read and re-read the stories should ensure
these frames are an adequate representation of the reports. Additionally, the fact that the
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data used in this study were strictly limited to printed news media may not account for all
possible frames constructed around the response to Hurricane Katrina. Lastly, due to the
highly specific nature of this study, the results may not be generalizable to other studies
of textual framing analysis in crisis situations.

Heuristics
Although this research provides clear insight into the way in which the
government and the press frames the response to Hurricane Katrina, there are several
areas in which the research could be expounded. Most notably, looking to the
organizational construction of frames presented by media outlets would posit an
insightful extension of the current research. Additionally, performing a quantitative
framing analysis could enhance the internal validity of this study to confirm the
prevalence of themes, which go into the construction of a frame.
Outside of this study, there are several areas of inquiry which could be examined
to better understand the frames surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Looking at how the
ground reporters constructed stories versus how office-bound journalists reported on the
events would provide clarity to the question of reporter bias. Additionally, a separate
study looking at how televised reports framed the event could yield insightful analysis to
understanding how Katrina was framed.
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Appendix B – Executive Summary
Purpose
Hurricane Katrina is widely regarded as the greatest natural disaster to ever befall
the United States. Following the storms devastation of the Gulf Coast region, a media
firestorm unleashed, seeking to ascribe responsibility to governmental actors for the
“failed” response effort. Through a comparative framing analysis, this study sought to
investigate how major news outlets, the White House, and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency framed the response efforts that followed Hurricane Katrina.
Framing Analysis
To understand framing analysis, one must first understand what a frame is. Jim
Kuypers, political communication scholar and framing researcher defined framing as “a
process whereby communicators, consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a point
of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted by others in a
particular manner” (Kuypers, 2010).” The process of framing a particular event requires
the construction of a particular viewpoint, emphasizing certain facts to produce a specific
interpretation of that event. From this, the term frame can be understood as the central or
underlying theme under which the facts or details are organized.
When put in the context of news reporting, the demonstration of the process
becomes clear. Rarely do news reports contain every detail of an event. If reporting every
detail in a detailed manner became the norm, the news would not be digestible. Instead,
news reports collect the data necessary to relay the general details of a particular event to
the audience. The process by which the author filters certain details out, includes others,
or highlights specific details more than others demonstrates the construction of a frame.
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For the most part, this practice is essential for the press to perform its function of
reporting. However, at times, personal or institutional biases influence the decision as to
what to include, exclude, or highlight in a given story.
Framing analysis is an ideal research method for analyzing large amounts of data.
The data consists of stories, releases, and briefing, with an array of implications.
However, framing analysis can only speak to the characteristics of the coverage, not the
implications. This approach gives us the ability to look at central organizing themes
throughout the data, instead of evaluating each piece independently. Comparative
framing analysis allows us to then compare and contrast frames from the respective
organizations to gain a richer understanding of messages communicated regarding the
governmental response to Hurricane Katrina.
Research Questions
To understand the phenomena, the following research questions were posed:
RQ 1: How did the White House frame the recovery efforts to Hurricane Katrina?
RQ 2: How did FEMA frame the recovery efforts to Hurricane Katrina?
RQ 3: How did printed news outlets frame the response to Hurricane Katrina?
RQ 4: Did the frames presented by FEMA, the White House, and the press coincide?
RQ 5: Did the frames presented by FEMA, the White House, and the press contradict?
Methods
A comparative framing analysis was conducted in this study. The study examined
how news media outlets and government entities framed the events of and response
efforts to Hurricane Katrina. Specifically, the study compared the frames present within
sixty-five press briefings by the Office of the Press Secretary, 185 press releases from the
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and contrasted them to the frames
presented in 312 printed newspaper articles for one calendar year following the storm
making landfall in the gulf. The study focused on printed news stories published by The
Washington Post, The New York Times, and USA Today.
Articles were retrieved by using the LexisNexis database. Boolean expressions
were used for article identification including “hurricane” and “Katrina” in headlines and
leads. Press releases and briefings were collected from the FEMA Press Release Archives
and Office of the Press Secretary Archives, respectively. Articles and releases that made
minimal references to the storm (eg. obituaries, opinion editorials, and news briefs) were
excluded from the study.
To identify the frames the researcher read each article, briefing, and press release
and determined the thesis or organizing theme it contained. Each was compiled in a list,
according to the organization that produced it. Once all of the data was examined, the
process was repeated, as to confirm the validity of the frames. From there, the frames,
based on relatively frequency, were documented and reported. From these results,
identifying where frames coincided or contradicted was a matter of evaluating points of
intersection.
Findings




The White House often described the response in terms of the allocation of
federal resources, shifting the focus to response efforts, instead of addressing
questions of failure, avoiding the blame game, and eventually, acknowledging the
lessons learned in crisis communication.
FEMA described the response effort in terms of an all-encompassing approach.
Quite literally, the “by the numbers” approach taken by FEMA pointed to the
allocation of all available resources to meeting the needs of the residents of Gulf
Coast.
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News outlets described the response in terms of inadequacies and failures,
specifically:
o Lack of federal action
o Lack of federal action, due to the racial composition of New Orleans
o Delayed federal action
o Failed response efforts
Frames coincided in the following areas:
o Both FEMA and the White House coincided on response efforts, in terms
of focusing efforts on the needs of the victims.
Frames contradicted in the following areas:
o The White House framing of the federal response effort compared news
outlet reporting on the response effort.
o FEMA’s framing of the detailed approach compared to the news outlet
reporting of a lack of response efforts.

Limitations
The following limitations were noted in this study:
 The data set was limited to printed sources, which may not account for every
frame.
 Researcher bias could affect the identification of frames.
 The findings of this study cannot be generalized to other forms of crisis reporting.
Future Research
This study provides a springboard for additional research on the matter of framing the
response to Hurricane Katrina. Some possible areas of exploration are:
 Replicating the study with the inclusion of local newspaper.
 Replicating the study with the inclusion of electronic media sources.
 Replicating the study with the inclusion of electronic governmental sources.
 Performing a visual framing analysis of still photography or video photography to
examine additional or alternative frames.
 Performing a quantitative content analysis to establish the statistical significance
of frames.
 Studying the differences in news reports from journalists on the ground in New
Orleans, versus those based out of their central offices.
Conclusions
Comparative framing analysis provides a critical perspective in understanding
how organizations ascribe meaning to events. While governmental reports tended to
focus on the resource allocation and dedication to helping the victims of the storm, news
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outlets tended to frame the response effort as “too little, too late.” Looking at how the two
outlets reached different conclusions regarding the same response demonstrates the
diversity and richness of mass communication.
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